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LIABILITY NOT WAIVED FOR LACKAWANNA COLLEGE:
ATHLETIC PROGRAMS MAY NOT DISREGARD
MINIMAL STANDARDS OF CARE AND SAFETY
“Colleges are expected to put a priority on the health and safety of their
students, especially student athletes engaged in dangerous sports.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Football is an inherently dangerous sport.2  Given the potential
for athletes to sustain injuries, liability waivers are one way in which
colleges and other athletic or academic entities protect themselves
from liability when athletes are injured while playing football.3
However, courts have established that colleges have a duty to pro-
vide a safe environment for college athletes.4  In Feleccia v. Lack-
awanna College, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania had to
determine whether Augustus Feleccia and Justin Resch (hereinafter
“Plaintiffs”) could sue Lackawanna College and other various, in-
volved parties (hereinafter “Defendants”) for injuries sustained
while playing football, even though both individuals each know-
1. See Daniel J. Siegel, Superior Court Refuses to Apply Exculpatory Waivers to Col-
lege Football Players Injured During Practice Drills – Attorneys Daniel Siegel and Nicole




ing Plaintiffs’ foundational position during trial and importance of protecting stu-
dent-athletes from foreseeable risks of injury).
2. See id. (analyzing Judge Jacqueline Shogan’s statements about “Oklahoma
Drill,” recognizing that “aside from the concern about this practice drill being an
inherent risk of football, we are concerned with a release being used to excuse a
college from having qualified medical personnel readily available,” and specifically
for sport with such inherent risks).
3. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200, 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017)
(determining that Plaintiffs agreed to sign liability waivers that would traditionally
have protected Lackawanna College from suit following any injuries sustained by
student-athletes while participating in school’s athletic programs, and, ultimately,
granting appeal to Supreme Court of Pennsylvania), appeal granted, 359 MAL 2017
(Pa. 2017).
4. See Andrew Rhim, The Special Relationship Between Student-Athletes and Colleges:
An Analysis of a Heightened Duty of Care for the Injuries of Student-Athletes, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 329 (acknowledging that colleges have heightened duty of care to stu-
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ingly signed a liability waiver.5 Feleccia is a notable case because of
its examination of the effectiveness of a liability waiver under the
heightened standard of care present in the student athlete-college
relationship.6
It is important to examine three different legal concepts in or-
der to evaluate the potential ramifications of the Feleccia decision:
the duty owed to college athletes, the heightened duty of care and
minimal safety standards associated with such duty, and the limita-
tions of a liability waiver’s release from suit.7  This Comment ana-
lyzes the scope of a college’s duty to student athletes and the issue
of whether a liability waiver protects colleges from suit where the
college failed to provide certain minimal standards of care and
safety.8
In Section Two, this Comment examines the factual back-
ground of Feleccia and its pending Pennsylvania Supreme Court ap-
peal.9  Next, in Section Three, this Comment examines factual
issues surrounding the Feleccia case, including the liability waiver,
Lackawanna College’s knowledge of hiring two uncertified athletic
trainers, and the injuries sustained by Plaintiffs Feleccia and Resch
while participating in an “Oklahoma Drill.”10  In Section Four, this
Comment focuses on the duty of care owed to college athletes, the
minimal care and safety standards required of colleges, and ana-
lyzes how reckless conduct is distinguishable from negligence, spe-
5. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1206 (noting that Plaintiffs both knowingly signed
liability waiver acknowledging that they would be unable to sue Lackawanna Col-
lege in event of injuries incurred while playing football).
6. See id. at 1219–20 (reversing summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor when
liability waiver did not automatically release Lackawanna College from liability and
reserving liability issue for presentation to jury).
7. See generally Andrew Rhim, supra note 4 (discussing these three legal con- R
cepts related to duty of care and the resulting liability analysis at issue in Feleccia).
8. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1208–09 (holding that Plaintiffs were able to sue
Lackawanna College because Lackawanna’s hiring of uncertified athletic trainers
failed to meet minimal standards of care and safety, including following Athletic
Training Board Certification guidelines).  For further discussion of colleges’ duties
to student-athletes and waiver protections, see infra notes 30–38 and accompany- R
ing text.
9. See generally Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200 (Pa. Super Ct.
2017) (noting Superior Court decision, which is awaiting a Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision).  For further discussion of the facts in the Feleccia case, see infra
notes19–26 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the issues on appeal, R
see infra note 115 and accompanying text. R
10. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1206–09 (recognizing key issues in Feleccia case and
examining appellate court’s treatment of those issues in determining that Plaintiffs
could sue Lackawanna College for its conduct).
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cifically in the Feleccia case.11  Finally, in Section Five, this Comment
advocates for the Plaintiffs’ position that colleges owe a duty to pro-
vide safe playing environments for student athletes and determines
that Lackawanna College breached its duty by hiring uncertified
athletic trainers, Coyne and Bonisese.12  This Comment posits that
the Supreme Court should affirm the Superior Court’s decision in
favor of Plaintiffs Feleccia and Resch, because student athletes can-
not assume the risk of a college’s reckless or grossly negligent
misconduct.13
II. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE FELECCIA CASE
A. The Basics of Feleccia
1. The “Oklahoma Drills” at Issue
Feleccia is a Pennsylvania Superior Court case involving two stu-
dent football players who were injured while participating in an
“Oklahoma Drill” during the first day of contact football practice.14
The “Oklahoma Drill” is a tackle drill in which players are in-
structed to engage in one-on-one tackles with their heads up.15
Plaintiffs were both injured during the drill and subsequently sued
Lackawanna College for damages arising out of their injuries.16
The trial court in their case granted summary judgment in favor of
Lackawanna College, but then the Superior Court reversed that de-
11. See id. (discussing how Plaintiffs were able to sue Lackawanna College
when Lackawanna failed to hire certified athletic trainers to oversee contact foot-
ball practices).  For further discussion of the duty of care owed to college athletes,
see infra note 133 and accompanying text. R
12. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1207–08 (recognizing that foreseeable injuries
may occur when uncertified athletic trainers are unable to provide adequate medi-
cal attention to players during tackle drills).  For further discussion of this Com-
ment’s position, see infra notes 74–102 and accompanying text. R
13. See also Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1215–16 (examining Lackawanna College’s
conduct and noting court’s determination that grossly negligent or reckless mis-
conduct is not shielded by Plaintiffs’ signing of liability waiver).  For further discus-
sion of this Comment’s stance that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirm the
Superior Court’s decision, see infra notes 223–257 and accompanying text. R
14. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1204–05 (stating that plaintiffs Justin Resch and
Augustus Feleccia began playing football at ages six and ten, respectively).
15. See id. at 1205–08 (describing how both Plaintiffs were injured while par-
ticipating in “Oklahoma Drill” during spring football practice at Lackawanna
College).
16. See id. at 1205 (noting danger of “Oklahoma Drill” and potential for head
injuries when players engage in head-on collisions); see also David Fleming, Is the
Oklahoma Drill a Rite of Passage or Everything to Fear About Football?, ESPN (Aug. 19,
2015), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/13348894/is-oklahoma-
drill-just-rite-passage-everything-fear-football [https://perma.cc/V8GG-4U9H]
(noting that Howie Long, rookie Villanova University football player, was “left bat-
tered, bloody, and flat on his back” while participating in drill).
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cision.17  In doing so, it concluded that a jury should decide
whether hiring uncertified athletic trainers increased the risk of
harm to student athletes.18
Lackawanna College is a non-profit junior college in North-
eastern Pennsylvania and a member of the National Junior College
Athletic Association (“NJCAA”).19  Prior to the Spring 2010 football
season, Plaintiffs signed a liability waiver ostensibly releasing Lack-
awanna College from liability and suit.20  At trial, both Plaintiffs ad-
mitted to knowing that signing the waiver purportedly barred them
from suing Lackawanna College in the event of an injury.21
Despite signing the waiver, Plaintiffs brought suit in Lack-
awanna County Court of Common Pleas for their personal injuries
sustained on March 29, 2010.22  They contended liability arose be-
cause Lackawanna College decided to hire two individuals, Kaitlin
Coyne and Alexis Bonisese, as athletic trainers who were uncertified
at the time of hiring.23  Lackawanna believed they would become
certified at a future date.24  However, Coyne and Bonisese had not
been certified at the time of the Plaintiffs’ injuries; they were essen-
tially hired with the future “intent to serve as Athletic Trainers.”25
17. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1209 (discussing Lackawanna College’s decision to
hire two uncertified athletic trainers prior to 2010 spring contact football season as
well as role of this decision in Superior Court’s liability determination).
18. See Terrie Morgan-Besecker, Court Rules Football Players Can Sue Lack-
awanna College for Injuries, THE TIMES TRIBUNE (Mar. 6, 2017), https://
www.thetimes-tribune.com/news/court-rules-football-players-can-sue-lackawanna-
college-for-injuries-1.2163759 [https://perma.cc/96CW-6CP2] (analyzing Feleccia
and impact of court’s holding on potential for future Plaintiffs to sue colleges even
if they knowingly signed liability waivers); see also Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1212–13 (rec-
ognizing Superior Court’s holding and resulting potential for future personal in-
jury litigation created by unenforceability of Plaintiff’s liability waivers and
Superior Court’s decision not to relieve Lackawanna of its liability towards
Plaintiffs).
19. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1203 (recognizing Lackawanna as member of Na-
tional Junior College Athletic Association, not NCAA).
20. See id. at 1209–10 (noting purpose of liability waivers in collegiate sports
activities).
21. See id. at 1206 (noting traditional function of liability waivers).
22. See id. at 1204–05.
23. See id. at 1203 (recognizing Coyne and Bonisese’s lack of training
certification).
24. See id. at 1203–04 (examining factual circumstances of Lackawanna Col-
lege hiring athletic trainers for 2010 football season and recognizing that Coyne
and Bonisese were uncertified at time of hiring but had potential to become certi-
fied at some unspecified future date).
25. See id. at 1203–04 (acknowledging at trial that former professor of Coyne
and Bonisese expressed concern to Lackawanna College Athletic Department that
both women were “impermissibly providing athletic services”).  Therefore, Lack-
awanna College had knowledge of potential safety concerns associated with Coyne
4
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2. The Feleccia Court’s Use of Prior Case Law
In analyzing the liability waiver, the Superior Court in Feleccia
examined several prior cases involving liability waivers, the assump-
tion of risk doctrine, and the relevant standard of care.26  The
Pennsylvania cases examined included Valentino v. Philadelphia
Triathlon, LLC,27 Hughes v. Seven Spring Farms, Inc.,28 Tayar v. Camel-
back Ski Corp.,29 and Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg,30 most notably.  In
Kleinknecht, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals specifically ex-
amined the issue of a student athlete’s relationship with the school
he attended.31  In Kleinknecht, a Gettysburg College lacrosse player
died following a cardiac arrest he sustained during lacrosse prac-
tice.32  The plaintiffs in Kleinknecht sued Gettysburg College and ar-
gued the school failed to protect student athlete Drew Kleinknecht
when it improperly handled his medical emergency during the
practice.33  The case made it up to the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in
the wrongful death lawsuit, reasoning that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court would likely recognize a “special relationship” be-
tween Kleinknecht and Gettysburg College that would impose a
“duty of reasonable care on the [c]ollege.”34  Until Kleinknecht, a
Pennsylvania case had not explicitly addressed a student athlete’s
and Bonisese’s instruction during football practice yet continued to employ both
individuals as athletic trainers. See id.
26. See id. at 1210–15 (recognizing several key cases Superior Court used
when evaluating liability issues and Lackawanna’s conduct).
27. 150 A.3d 483 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (noting Pennsylvania Superior court
properly struck down plaintiff’s claim against Philadelphia Triathlon when no evi-
dence of outrageous behavior or conscious disregard for risks associated with
triathlon event existed).
28. 762 A.2d 339 (Pa. 2000) (recognizing plaintiff could not recover for inju-
ries from skiing accident because colliding with another skier is inherent risk that
plaintiff assumed and no evidence of gross negligence or reckless conduct
existed).
29. 47 A.3d 1190 (Pa. 2012) (noting pre-injury liability waiver may not cover
reckless conduct).
30. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360, 1364 (3d Cir. 1993) (pre-
dicting potential future outcome for similar liability cases presented to Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court).
31. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1365 (analyzing duty owed to student-athletes
as largely undetermined by preceding cases in Pennsylvania courts); see also Feleccia,
156 A.3d at 1214–15 (recognizing Kleinknecht court analyzed several Florida and
Indiana cases to show how other states have determined special duty of care under
student athlete relationship).
32. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1367 (noting Third Circuit’s reasoning and its
future applicability to cases involving negligent actions of college employees).
33. See id. at 1363–66 (providing facts of Kleinknecht case).
34. See id. at 1367 (holding reasonable duty of care existed between Gettys-
burg College lacrosse player and Gettysburg College and that this “special relation-
5
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relationship with his or her college in a tort action.35  However, the
plaintiffs in Kleinknecht argued that colleges nonetheless owe ath-
letes a duty to provide adequate medical services during instances
involving medical emergencies, under the specific standard of a
reasonable duty of care.36  Lastly, the court in Kleinknecht distin-
guished between student athletes injured while participating as ath-
letes and students injured engaging in activities that were more
personal in nature.37  The Third Circuit predicted the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would hold that in situations where student athletes
participate in the athletic programs when their respective colleges
sought their involvement, colleges have a duty to students, which
exists under these special circumstances.38
B. The Liability Waiver
One major issue through the Feleccia litigation has been the
liability waiver issue; prior to spring football tryouts, Plaintiffs
“‘skimmed’ and signed” a “Waiver of Liability and Hold Harmless
Agreement” for Lackawanna College.39  The liability waiver re-
leased Defendants from any and all liability arising out of injury
sustained while participating in contact football at Lackawanna Col-
lege.40  Both Plaintiffs admitted signing the waiver, which pre-
cluded suit against Lackawanna for any and all injuries they
sustained.41
The liability waiver presented to the Plaintiffs essentially sought
to protect Lackawanna from personal injury suits arising out of stu-
ship” was sufficient to potentially hold Gettysburg College liable for negligent
actions of employees, which ultimately resulted in plaintiff’s death).
35. See id. at 1365–67 (addressing plaintiff’s argument to Third Circuit and
recognition that colleges owed duty to student athletes—specifically in cases in-
volving medical emergencies—even though Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not
definitely decided on this issue in previous cases).
36. See id. at 1367 (discussing duty owed to student athletes and clearer dis-
tinction of college and student athlete relationship in Kleinknecht, specifically be-
cause previous Pennsylvania cases had not specifically examined this issue).
37. See id. at 1368–69 (noting duty imposed on college directly seeking partici-
pation of student athlete that had previously experienced cardiac arrest during its
sponsored practice).
38. See id. at 1369 (explaining court’s reasoning for holding that duty existed
between colleges and student athletes).
39. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1205–06 (noting document produced by Lack-
awanna College and thereinafter signed by Plaintiffs).
40. See id. at 1206 (examining liability waiver Plaintiffs signed in Feleccia and
noting Plaintiffs acknowledged contractual language prior to participation in con-
tact football at Lackawanna College).
41. See id. at 1206–07.
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dent athletes’ participation in contact football.42  While Plaintiffs
admitted they skimmed and signed the waiver, releasing Lack-
awanna from liability, they later sued Lackawanna College for per-
sonal injuries sustained at football practice.43  During trial,
Lackawanna argued Feleccia and Resch understood the dangers of
the Oklahoma Drill.44  Plaintiffs challenged Defendant’s assertion
by arguing that when they signed the liability waiver, they were una-
ware of “Lackawanna’s failure to take reasonable measures” to as-
sure their safety.45  Specifically, the “Lackawanna College Waiver of
Liability and Hold Harmless Agreement” provided:
1. In consideration for my participation in (sport), I
hereby release, waive, discharge, and covenant not to sue
Lackawanna College . . . while participating in such ath-
letic activity.
. . . .
4. It is my express intent that this Release and Hold Harm-
less Agreement . . . shall be deemed as a release, waiver,
discharge, and covenant not to sue Lackawanna College,
its trustees, officers, agents, and employees.46
Both Plaintiffs acknowledged on the liability waiver they were
participating in contact football at Lackawanna College.47  Plaintiffs
signed the liability waivers on March 22, 2010, prior to their partici-
42. See id. at 1206 (noting liability waiver would traditionally “release, waive,
discharge, and covenant,” individuals signing it “not to sue Lackawanna College
for any and all liability arising out of or related to injury . . . that may be sustained
while participating in such athletic activity”).
43. See id. at 1206–08 (examining intent behind drafting and signing “Lack-
awanna College Waiver of Liability and Hold Harmless Agreement,” and tradi-
tional purpose of liability waivers).
44. See id. (noting Plaintiff’s acknowledgment of such risks by signing liability
waiver).
45. Id. at 1219 (analyzing whether Plaintiffs understood types of risks released
by liability waiver, which was point of contention during trial).
46. See id. at 1205–07 (quoting actual liability waiver signed by both players,
which included language that mentioned participation in athletic activities at Lack-
awanna College).  This waiver was presented at trial for the purpose of examining
Lackawanna College’s statements purporting to release them of any and all liability
related to injuries sustained during contact football practice. See id.
47. See id. at 1205–06 (acknowledging Plaintiffs’ material admissions regard-
ing participation in Lackawanna College’s contact football program); see also Brief
for Appellees at *57, Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (NO. 385 MDA 2016), 2016 Pa. Sup. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 794 (noting that briefs
presented at trial are cross-referenced in the Superior Court Case); see also Feleccia,
156 A.3d at 1206 (recognizing that “Lackawanna College’s Statement of Material
Facts 12/2/15, at Exhibit E,” was provided as evidence during trial to indicate that
Feleccia and Resch did, in fact, admit to knowingly signing liability waivers in order
to participate in contact football at Lackawanna College).
7
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pation in the first day of spring football practice.48  However, at trial
they claimed while they knowingly signed the waiver, they were una-
ware Lackawanna hired uncertified trainers.49  Plaintiffs argued
that, therefore, Lackawanna College was grossly negligent in its fail-
ure to provide trainers with the requisite certifications, and that its
Athletic Training Department completely disregarded the safety of
its student athletes in violation of Pennsylvania law.50
1. Prior Unenforceability of Liability Waivers
There is a robust body of scholarship examining the issue of
the use of liability waivers in sports, noting specific instances in
which liability waivers were invalidated due to the negligence of
sports program organizers.51  The challenge in evaluating the valid-
ity of liability waivers is recognizing when negligent conduct
prevails over the “assumption of risk doctrine.”52  Under the “as-
sumption of risk” doctrine, injured players knowingly assume the
risk of injury if they provide written consent.53  The traditional ex-
ample of written consent is signing a liability waiver.54  There are
two types of assumption of risk defenses that may be raised in in-
stances of sports injuries.55  These defenses include either an im-
plied or express assumption of risk.56  Either defense may prevail in
48. See id. at 1205 (examining when Plaintiffs signed liability waivers).
49. See id. at 1208–09 (noting Plaintiffs acknowledged liability waiver and con-
tractual terms but did not knowingly acknowledge being trained by uncertified
athletic trainers).
50. See id. at 1208 (stating Superior Court’s holding).
51. See Matthew S. Thor, This is Not Sparta: The Extensive and Unknown Inherent
Risks in Obstacle Racing, 51 VAL U.L. REV. 251 (2016) (acknowledging case of obsta-
cle races and arguing that obstacle racing liability waivers should be inherently
invalid because participants are not aware of all potential risks involved); see also
Devon Battersby, Running on Empty or Water or Gatorade?, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (2003) (examining whether participants fully understand all
inherent risks involved when participating in “highly intensified” and arguably
dangerous activities); Douglas Leslie, Sports Liability Waivers and Transactional Un-
conscionability, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 341 (2014) (explaining unen-
forceability of liability waivers in specific sports law cases, specifically where
defendant’s conduct went beyond ordinary negligence).
52. See Thor, supra note 51, at 261–62 (noting distinction between acknowl- R
edgment of inherent risks and issues presented when participants are unable to
understand and consent to all possible risks present in activity).
53. See id. (examining “assumption of risk” doctrine in tort lawsuits).
54. See id. at 261 (recognizing scope of assumption of risk doctrine and chal-
lenges presented when individuals are unaware of some inherent risks involved
when participating in potentially dangerous activities but do not understand all
risks).
55. See id. (discussing two types of defenses defendant schools may use when
faced with tort lawsuits).
56. See id. (acknowledging defenses to assumption of risk doctrine).
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cases where parties fully consented to all risks they will, or may, en-
counter during an activity.57
However, Plaintiffs’ arguments in Feleccia are unique on the lia-
bility waiver issue; Feleccia and Resch acknowledged that while they
waived liability for inherent risks involved in contact football, they
did not have explicit knowledge the athletic trainers were uncerti-
fied.58  Therefore, the Superior Court’s holding highlighted the dif-
ference between knowingly and unknowingly consenting to
inherent risks.59  Specifically, the court examined whether Plaintiffs
knew Lackawanna College’s athletic trainers were uncertified, and
whether those risks were assumed when the Plaintiffs signed the
liability waiver.60
While not involving student athletes, Sa v. Red Frog Events,
LLC61 is a factually similar case on the liability waiver issue.62  In Sa,
a Federal Court sitting in Michigan determined a liability waiver was
invalid because the defendant’s conduct increased the inherent
risks associated with participating in a racing competition, and the
plaintiff did not consent to the amplifying conduct.63  The plaintiff,
James Sa, was paralyzed while participating in the Warrior Dash, a
Michigan running race organized by Red Frog Events.64  The War-
rior Dash is a dangerous obstacle race wherein participants engage
in challenges like climbing walls, jumping over fire, and running
over a mud pit.65  The plaintiff was severely injured and paralyzed
during the race when he dove head first into a mud pit.66  During
the race, Red Frog Events’ employees repeatedly coaxed the plain-
tiff to dive into the mud pit, and such conduct of yelling and pres-
suring individuals in this manner was atypical for participants while
57. See id. at 261–63 (explaining when plaintiffs have adequately assumed all
potential risk of injury).
58. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1219–20 (noting that Plaintiffs did not knowingly
and voluntarily rely on, and Lackawanna did not disclose, that its college athletic
trainers were uncertified).
59. See id. at 1218 (discussing known and unknown risks)
60. See id. at 1206–09 (explaining court’s reasoning in decision not to imme-
diately waive liability for Lackawanna College).
61. 979 F. Supp. 2d 767 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
62. See id. at 768–71 (noting Sa’s factual background).
63. See id. at 779–80 (holding that Red Frog Events, LLC was “grossly negli-
gent” when telling competitors to jump into mud pit because such conduct ampli-
fied inherent risks associated with competition).
64. See id. at 769–70 (stating injuries suffered by plaintiff).
65. See id. at 770 (noting inherent risks associated with Warrior Dash racing
competition and kinds of activities participants were engaged in during race).
66. See id. at 770–71 (discussing plaintiff’s conduct, conduct of Red Frog
Events’ employees, and resulting injuries sustained from diving into mud pit).
9
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running through the mud pit.67  The Eastern District of Michigan
concluded the defendant, Red Frog Events, was grossly negligent in
encouraging the plaintiff to dive into the mud pit.68  Additionally,
such conduct depicted a substantial lack of concern for the plain-
tiff’s care and safety.69  Therefore, that court invalidated the liability
waiver due to grossly negligent conduct.70
2. The Presence of Liability Waivers in College Sports Programs
While colleges increasingly use liability waivers in today’s col-
legiate and recreational sports programs, there are an increasing
number of cases involving the refutability of pre-injury liability waiv-
ers in certain instances.71  The enforceability of a “liability waiver”
has evolved over time as a response to previous court decisions
holding colleges liable for the injuries of student athletes.72  While
liability waivers previously released inherent risks of particular activ-
ities, various courts today are now re-examining the specific kinds
of conduct liability waivers do not release.73  Certain courts around
the country, such as the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Feleccia,
have held certain liability waivers are unenforceable in cases of rec-
ognizable gross negligence or reckless conduct.74
67. See id. at 771–72 (noting that plaintiff sustained severe injuries following
pressure from employees to jump into mud pit during race and finding this kind
of conduct “grossly negligent” and atypical conduct).
68. See id. at 779 (noting court’s holding that “Defendant’s actions amounted
to willful and wanton misconduct”).
69. See id. at 778–79 (holding that defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s intent
to dive into mud pit was “immaterial” to establishing liability because defendant’s
conduct of encouraging James Sa to dive in pit showed substantial lack of care for
his health and safety).
70. See id. at 779 (discussing Michigan court’s holding that liability waiver was
invalid where defendant engaged in grossly negligent conduct).
71. See Joshua D. Arters, Kindly Remove My Child from the Bubble Wrap–Analyzing
Childress v. Madison County and Why Tennessee Courts Should Enforce Parental Pre-
Injury Liability Waivers, 11 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 8, 9–10 (2016) (examining instances
where courts have determined that certain liability waivers are unenforceable).
For further discussion on the recognition that it is uncommon to invalidate liabil-
ity waivers, see infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text. R
72. See Arters, supra note 71, at 9–10 (noting prior instances of
unenforceability).
73. See id. at 49–51 (noting Childress, Hawk, and Troxel are California and Ten-
nessee tort cases holding pre-injury liability waivers unenforceable when they “in-
vade a parent’s constitutional decision-making authority”).
74. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200, 1212–15 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (noting Superior Court’s analysis of Pennsylvania cases on similar liability
issues).
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Liability waivers in college sports programs have existed for de-
cades and primarily arise out of the potential for litigation.75  While
Pennsylvania has limited caselaw on the issue of liability waivers and
college athletes, an analysis of caselaw from another jurisdiction
provides insight into the history of this issue.76  In Wisconsin, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals not only acknowledged a duty be-
tween college athletes and colleges, but also defined the law con-
cerning the validation of liability waivers in the presence of grossly
negligent or reckless conduct.77  For example, in Ross v. Creighton
University,78 the Seventh Circuit held that student athletes must
show a college failed to honor an “identifiable promise” in order to
recover damages.79  This Seventh Circuit ruling on contractual is-
sues is similar to cases involving liability waivers because both types
of contracts may be invalidated when colleges have breached a
“promise,” as in Ross, or their duty of care to particular individu-
als.80  Therefore, the ruling in Ross shows how a previous case han-
dled this issue, specifically by examining contractual obligations
and negligent conduct that breach this duty of care.81
75. See Matthew J. Mitten, Marquette University Faculty Perspectives: Seventh Circuit
and Wisconsin Sports Law Jurisprudence, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 207, 208–10 (2014)
(discussing previous cases involving liability waivers and college sports and noting
colleges often utilize liability waivers due to potential for future tort actions from
players who sustain injuries).
76. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1214–15 (noting that while Feleccia court relied on
Pennsylvania caselaw, issues in cases examined did not directly relate to specific
facts of Feleccia case; Kleinknecht, where Gettysburg College student was killed dur-
ing lacrosse practice due to gross negligence of coaching staff in obtaining medical
personnel in time to treat plaintiff’s cardiac arrest, was factually closest).
77. See Mitten supra note 75, at 210 (recognizing existence and use of liability R
waivers in college athletic programs as means for colleges to evade future tort
lawsuits).
78. 957 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing similar case involving contrac-
tual liability issues).
79. See Mitten, supra note 75, at 218–19 (identifying Seventh Circuit’s recovery R
standard in cases involving breach of contract claims between student-athletes and
colleges).
80. See id. (noting Seventh Circuit ruled on contract-related liability issues and
that while both Ross and Feleccia discussed contract-related issues, treatment and
discussion of contract’s language differed between cases).
81. See id. (examining court’s holding in Ross and comparing issues presented
in Ross to those in Creighton and Feleccia).
11
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C. The Uncertified Athletic Trainers
1. Lackawanna’s Trainers
Lackawanna College typically employs two athletic trainers for
its football program.82  Prior to the 2010 spring football season,
Lackawanna hired two women, Kaitlyn Coyne and Alexis Bonisese,
as athletic trainers.83  Although they each had a B.S. in Athletic
Training, neither was licensed nor certified, either at the time of
hiring or at the time of Feleccia and Resch’s injuries.84  The under-
lying issue in Feleccia is whether the Coyne and Bonisese’s hirings,
despite the trainers’ uncertified status, shows negligence on behalf
of Lackawanna College, and whether the Plaintiffs’ injuries were
ultimately connected to the school’s hiring decision.85  On appeal,
Plaintiffs argued Lackawanna College had a duty to provide certi-
fied athletic trainers under a reasonable standard of care in order
to help ensure student athlete’s safety during participation in con-
tact football.86
In August 2009, Lackawanna College hired Coyne and
Bonisese with the knowledge both individuals were uncertified as
athletic trainers.87  When Coyne and Bonisese learned they had
failed board certification, they informed Lackawanna’s athletic di-
rector prior to the Spring 2010 football season.88  After learning of
their lack of certification, the athletic director at Lackawanna Col-
lege actually re-titled Coyne and Bonisese as “First Responders.”89
However, even though both positions were re-titled, Lackawanna
College did not alter their job descriptions to reflect the change in
82. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200, 1203 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (noting factual circumstances and examining Lackawanna College’s con-
duct prior to Plaintiff’s injuries, including Coyne and Bonisese’s instruction and
oversight during “Oklahoma Drill”).
83. See id. at 1203–04 (recognizing lack of certification that was at issue in
Feleccia).
84. See id. at 1204–05 (discussing impact of both Plaintiffs’ injuries on their
abilities to sue Lackawanna College).
85. See id. at 1204 (noting relevance of Coyne and Bonisese’s lack of certifica-
tion on underlying liability issues and Plaintiffs’ resulting injuries).
86. See id. at 1210 (examining Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal).
87. See id. at 1203–04 (noting that despite known lack of certification of Lack-
awanna College’s athletic trainers, Lackawanna College hired and allowed them to
oversee contact football practice nonetheless).
88. See id. at 1203–04 (acknowledging hiring process and acknowledgement
that Coyne and Bonisese failed to obtain athletic training board certification).
89. See id. (acknowledging Lackawanna knew trainers were uncertified, yet re-
titled Coyne and Bonisese while allowing both to continue providing athletic train-
ing services).
12
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title from “Certified Athletic Trainer” to “First Responder.”90  Addi-
tionally, Lackawanna hired a third athletic trainer who did not at-
tend football practices, yet had an identical job description to
Coyne and Bonisese despite the different job titles.91  As such, the
Plaintiffs in Feleccia allege that both individuals continually lacked
the necessary certifications associated with their job titles at Lack-
awanna College.92
2. The “Oklahoma Drill” Injuries
The “Oklahoma Drill” is a contact football drill usually “per-
formed in a confined space.”93  The drill is commonly used at the
collegiate football level and is notorious for its high incidence of
injury.94  During trial, neither of the Plaintiffs’ experts testified
about the specifics of the drill, nor did they define the drill itself or
acknowledge its frequent use in football practice.95
Colleges use the “Oklahoma Drill” as a tool to determine
which players are not afraid to engage in contact.96  During the
tackle drill, “the fullback and linebacker are aligned on opposite
90. See id. at 1204 (recognizing Lackawanna College and knowledge of duties
and proper training for Coyne and Bonisese’s respective positions, and that Lack-
awanna retitled those individuals knowing they lacked skills necessary to fulfill role
of “athletic trainers”).
91. See id. (acknowledging hiring of third athletic trainer, yet recognizing
Lackawanna College’s actions of having Coyne and Bonisese perform same duties
as third certified athletic trainer).
92. See id. at 1204–05 (noting that Coyne and Bonisese continued to imper-
missibly provide same athletic training services even in their re-titled positions as
“First Responders”).
93. See id. at 1206 (recognizing dangerousness of this tackle drill and noting
previous injuries sustained by a football player who participated in drill).
94. See K. Adam Pretty, Dropping the Ball: The Failure of the NCAA to Address
Concussions in College Football, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2359, 2360 (2014) (examin-
ing dangerous nature of “Oklahoma Drill,” and relationship between drill use in
college athletic programs and failure of NCAA to address potential for concussions
and other serious injuries during its use).
95. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1205 (discussing instruction provided to Feleccia
and Resch during tackling drill, and drill’s dangerous nature).  Thus, there is ar-
guably a clear, obvious relationship between having uncertified athletic trainers
oversee a dangerous tackle drill, and the potential for injury that may occur as a
result. See id. at 1205–06.
96. See Pretty, supra note 94, at 2359–60 (noting purpose of “Oklahoma Drill”
and college football coaches’ use of it to determine which athletes would more
likely engage in contact with other players—to analyze “who was not afraid to hit”);
see also Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1203–06 (noting specific intent of Coyne and Bonisese
to instruct Lackawanna College football players to participate in “Oklahoma Drill”
is unknown, as this was not identified at trial; however, the drill is prominently
used during football practices to determine which players would engage in
contact).
13
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sides of the ball,” and are instructed to “collide at full speed.”97
The drill is dangerous because of its hard, head-on collisions.98  No-
tably, in 2011, Derek Sheely, a fullback at Frostburg State Univer-
sity, was severely injured during practice when he engaged in
similar head-on collision drills.99  The dangerous nature of the
“Oklahoma Drill” cannot be overstated.100
The Plaintiffs were injured while taking part in these
“Oklahoma Drills.”101  Both Plaintiffs knew Lackawanna College
used a variation of the “Oklahoma Drill.”102  While participating in
the drill during spring contact football practice, Feleccia suffered a
T-7 vertebral fracture.103 Later that practice, Resch participated in
two more “Oklahoma Drills” and was injured during both.104  Dur-
ing the first drill, Resch experienced numbness and tingling, which
radiated down his arms, and had significant difficulty moving his
right shoulder.105  After his first injury, Lackawanna’s “First Re-
sponder” Bonisese told Resch that he could continue practicing if
he was “feeling better”; Resch continued, but was injured again dur-
ing the second practice drill where he sustained significant injuries,
including a traumatic brachial plexus avulsion on his right side.106
However, the team continued to use the “Oklahoma Drill” in subse-
quent football practices despite Feleccia’s injury.107  Following such
conduct by Lackawanna College, Plaintiffs eventually filed suit in
97. See Pretty, supra note 94, at 2359 (recognizing dangerous nature of
“Oklahoma Drill” and inherent risks associated with even proper instruction of
drill, because of hard-collision nature of drill itself).
98. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1205 (discussing “Oklahoma Drill” and its specific
purpose during football practices).
99. See Pretty, supra note 94, at 2359 (recognizing seriousness of tackle drills R
and potential for injury that may occur when players are instructed to hit each
other “head-on”).
100. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1205–06 (describing inherent dangerousness of
Oklahoma Drill).
101. For a discussion of Plaintiffs’ injuries, see supra notes 24–25 and accom- R
panying text.
102. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1206–07 (stating Plaintiffs were aware of drills
when signing waivers).
103. See id. at 1207 (noting instruction of Lackawanna College’s athletic train-
ers and their impermissible conduct of overseeing dangerous tackle drills while
being uncertified athletic trainers).
104. See id. at 1206–07 (examining nature of “Oklahoma Drill” and its associ-
ated risks).
105. See id. (recognizing seriousness of Plaintiff’s injuries due to “head-on”
collisions).
106. See id. at 1207–08 (noting dangerousness of head-on collisions, which are
likely to result in head and neck injuries due to positions of players and force of
such collisions).
107. See id. at 1207 (analyzing injuries that occurred when participating in
“Oklahoma Drill,” which was well-known to many collegiate football programs).
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the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which was subse-
quently appealed to both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Su-
preme Court.108
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF FELECCIA V. LACKAWANNA COLLEGE
On February 2, 2016, the Lackawanna County Court of Com-
mon Pleas granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.109
In reviewing the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas’ deci-
sion, the Superior Court examined several issues, including
whether Lackawanna College’s conduct constituted recklessness or
gross negligence, and whether the trial court erred by finding that
the liability waiver “barred” both Feleccia and Resch’s personal in-
jury claims.110  The trial court’s ruling in favor of Lackawanna Col-
lege was based on a “determination that Plaintiffs claims [were]
barred by the waiver and assumption of risk.”111
On appeal, Plaintiffs argued the Superior Court should reverse
the Order on the basis that Lackawanna College’s conduct was that
“of such . . . egregious nature” needed in order to bring a successful
tort suit.112 On February 24, 2017, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
reversed the trial court’s Order for Summary Judgment, and re-
manded the case for trial due to the Superior Court’s decision that
general issues of material fact existed.113
On November 29, 2017, Lackawanna College filed for certiorari,
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Lackawanna Col-
108. For a discussion on the Feleccia case’s appellate history, see supra notes
5–8 and accompanying text. R
109. See Brief of Appellants at *2, Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (No. 385 MDA 2016), 2016 Pa. Sup. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 793
(noting trial court’s decision in favor of Lackawanna College and subsequent ap-
peal to Pennsylvania Superior Court by Plaintiffs Feleccia and Resch).
110. See id. at *3 (adding that several additional important questions needed
to be examined by Superior Court, including whether “defendants limited their
defense to assumption of risk” and “whether the court erred by failing to submit
the disputed factual questions to a jury”).
111. See id. at *54–55 (examining both trial court and appellate court
decisions).
112. See id. (noting that in Plaintiffs’ Brief, Plaintiffs argued that “[a] plaintiff
must have actual subject knowledge of the risk he faces for assumption[-]of[-]risk
to bar recovery.  In this case, the student-athletes reasonably relied upon the advice
and treatment of unqualified individuals when they decided to resume their partic-
ipation in the tackling drill which caused them catastrophic injuries”).
113. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1220 (noting Pennsylvania Superior Court’s final
decision in Feleccia, holding that gross negligence and reckless conduct was not
waiveable, even when Plaintiffs knowingly signed liability waiver but submitting lia-
bility issue of hiring uncertified athletic trainers to oversee contact football prac-
tices to jury).
15
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lege’s per curiam appeal.114  The Supreme Court granted the Defen-
dant’s appeal to determine:
1. Is a Pennsylvania college required to have qualified
medical personnel present at intercollegiate athletic
events to satisfy a duty of care to the college’s student
athletes?
2. Is an exculpatory clause releasing “any and all liability”
signed in connection with participation in intercollegiate
football enforceable as to negligence?115
Lackawanna’s appeal followed the Pennsylvania Superior
Court’s decision not to enforce the liability waiver under the as-
sumption of risk doctrine.116  While the Superior Court, one of
Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate courts, validated the assump-
tion of risk defense, the court ultimately determined that issues of
material fact were present for a jury to decide, although no jury
determination was actually made in the Superior Court case.117  In
its appeal, Lackawanna College argued the Superior Court “im-
properly imposed a new duty of care” to provide certified medical
care to student athletes.118  Furthermore, during oral argument at
the Supreme Court, Defendants argued the Superior Court failed
to apply previous state precedent for negligence claims.119  On ap-
peal, Defendants argued previous Pennsylvania courts had enforced
liability waivers in factually similar cases.120
114. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., No. 359 MAL 2017 (Pa. 2017) (noting
Supreme Court’s granting of Defendant’s petition for appeal).
115. See id. (explaining issues on appeal to Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
which have not yet been addressed, that oral argument is yet to be heard, and that
Supreme Court will decide this case at unspecified future date).
116. See Daniel E. Cummins, Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Waiver Form
and Assumption of Risk Defense in Context of Football Injuries, TORTTALK, (Mar. 16,
2017) http://www.torttalk.com/2017/03/pennsylvania-superior-court-ad-
dresses.html [https://perma.cc/FKE9-WUSW] (analyzing Superior Court’s deci-
sion in Feleccia).
117. See id. (establishing reason for presenting liability waiver issue to jury,
rather than ruling on summary judgment motion).
118. See Matt Fair, Pa. Justices Urged to Ax Duty of Care for Student-Athletes,
LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1011221/pa-justices-
urged-to-ax-duty-of-care-for-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/HZ28-DTCM] (an-
alyzing Defendant’s argument on appeal to Pennsylvania Supreme Court, stating
that appellate court failed to follow recognized principles of negligence tort law
when submitting liability waiver issue to jury instead of ruling on Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment).
119. See id. (noting issues raised on appeal to Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
120. See id. (examining Defendants’ arguments in their Supreme Court
appeal).
16
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Defendants made several statements during trial refuting the
negligence claims in order to bolster their contention that they did
not act negligently.121  Defendants argued Feleccia witnessed
Resch’s injuries during the first Oklahoma Drill, yet Feleccia
“elected” to continue participating in the tackle drills.122  Then, fol-
lowing Feleccia’s injuries during his participation in the drill,
Coyne and Bonisese immediately attended to his injuries and called
Emergency Medical Services to the scene.123  Finally, Defendants ar-
gued Coyne and Bonisese never misrepresented their respective po-
sitions as uncertified trainers, and they never performed duties
outside the scope of their employment at Lackawanna College.124
During oral argument at the Supreme Court, Lackawanna Col-
lege will likely argue that the liability waiver should not be treated
differently solely because of a collegiate football context.125  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will address these issues at a future
date.126
IV. DUTY OF CARE AND LIABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Colleges Have a Duty to Student Athletes
1. Employer-Employee Theory of Liability
Caselaw, including in Pennsylvania, suggests that colleges may
hold a duty to provide a safe environment for college athletes.127
121. See Brief of Appellants at *4–5, Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d
1200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (No. 385 MDA 2016), 2016 Pa. Sup. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
793 (examining the medical treatment and attention to Plaintiffs injuries immedi-
ately following the injuries).
122. See id. at *4 (describing Defendants’ arguments during trial).
123. See id. (recognizing contested issues between both parties).
124. See id. at *7 (noting that Coyne and Bonisese were “serving as First Re-
sponders” during Plaintiff’s injuries, positions they would serve until they became
certified athletic trainers).
125. See Fair, supra note 118 (recognizing potential arguments in future court R
appearances on this case, based on Defendants’ appeal brief to Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court).
126. See Matt Fair, Pa. Justices Question College’s Duty in Football Injury Row,
LAW360 (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1102981/pa-justices-
question-college-s-duty-in-football-injury-row [https://perma.cc/MB42-35H6]
(noting potential outcome of Supreme Court case following oral argument in Har-
risburg, Pennsylvania on December 5, 2018).
127. See Andrew Rhim, supra note 4, at 331 (examining cases addressing duty R
of care colleges should provide for student-athletes); see also Monica L. Emerick,
The University/Student Athlete Relationship: Duties Giving Rise to a Potential Educational
Hindrance Claim, 44 UCLA L. REV. 865, 884–85 (1997) (discussing nine factors
courts examine to determine whether duty of care exists between college or uni-
versity and its students, including “the likelihood of injury from the existence of
the activity” and “the closeness of a connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury” suffered by student); Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673 (Pa.
17
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One way to examine the liability relationship is under the theory
that colleges derive benefits from student athletes, and therefore
colleges have a “special relationship” with their student athletes.128
Caselaw suggests several ways to further examine this relationship
and determine the standard of care colleges owe students.129  For
example, there is the “employer-employee theory” of liability, which
has largely been rejected by courts.130  Instead, courts more re-
cently have examined the duty of care owed to student athletes
under a heightened principle of liability.131  The Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court first examined this heightened principle duty of care
in Hill v. Slippery Rock University, by addressing NCAA liability to stu-
dent athletes.132  The Feleccia court explicitly referenced this duty of
care when evaluating Lackawanna College’s conduct of hiring un-
certified athletic trainers.133
The “employer-employee” relationship theory posits that col-
lege athletes are, essentially, employees of their respective universi-
ties in this context.134  This concept of the employer-employee
relationship is especially relevant in discussions involving the liabil-
ity of colleges to NCAA athletes.135  However, several courts re-
Super. Ct. 2016) (examining relationship between NCAA and student-athletes,
where appellants in Hill argued that “the NCAA owned a duty of care to Plaintiff
because he was a student at Slippery Rock University,” not because plaintiff was
“employee” of school).
128. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 334–35 (discussing several theories of liability R
for student-athletes and colleges, noting that “special relationship” theory has been
examined by courts, and stating that although it is widely recognized that colleges
are not “custodians” of students, heightened duty of care existing between colleges
and its students “justified because students generate both economic and non-eco-
nomic benefits for colleges . . . and colleges have a ‘special relationship’ character-
ized by mutual dependence”).
129. See id. at 335 (discussing nature of college athletes and colleges’ respec-
tive “mutual dependence,” and several theories of liability established as result).
130. See id. (discussing applicable theories of liability, where employer-em-
ployee relationship theory has largely been rejected by United States courts).  For
further discussion of the employer-employee relationship, see infra notes 133–137 R
and accompanying text.
131. For further discussion of several applicable cases, see infra notes 134–138
and accompanying text.
132. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 336–37 (discussing “special duty of care” rela- R
tionship between college athletes and students); see also Hill, 138 A.3d at 676 (not-
ing Plaintiff’s argued “NCAA [had] duty to Mr. Hill,” who was student-athlete at
Slippery Rock University).
133. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1203–05 (examining Feleccia court’s treatment of
this liability issue).
134. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 336 (recognizing why such “special” duty of R
care exists).
135. See id. at 333–37 (noting heightened duty of care requirement for stu-
dent-athletes, resulting from “special relationship” between student-athletes and
colleges).
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jected this employer-employee theory, in favor, instead, of
arguments that colleges owe a heightened duty of care to students
under principles of tort liability.136  In rejecting the employer-em-
ployee theory, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California explicitly found that there is simply no legal
basis for finding student athletes to be “employees” under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, and the NCAA is not an applicable “em-
ployer.”137  In certain jurisdictions, courts have decided a height-
ened duty of care exists to protect students from foreseeable risks of
injury while playing collegiate sports; further, other courts have de-
cided that the employer-employee theory of liability is inapplicable
in cases involving similar heightened standards of care.138
2. Liability in Heightened Duty-of-Care Cases
Since football is an inherently dangerous sport with a height-
ened probability of injuries and a correspondingly high liability po-
tential for colleges, the scope of the colleges’ duty is to provide
reasonable care.139  There is a strong argument, supported by
caselaw, in favor of finding a duty for colleges to provide a reasona-
ble standard of care to its athletes, notably because colleges have
traditionally benefited from their students’ participation in athletic
programs.140  Thus, proponents argue, there should be a legally
136. See id. at 336 (analyzing theories of liability under analysis of “special
relationship” between student-athletes and college and recognizing several justifi-
cations for recognizing that “special relationship” exists in this context); see also
Paul Cannon, NCAA Liability to Student Athletes, TEX. PERS. INJURY LAW BLOG, (Apr.
30, 2016) https://www.simmonsandfletcher.com/blog/ncaa-liability-injuries-stu-
dent-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/V92J-W6BB] (recognizing tort lawsuits against
NCAA have been unfolding in recent cases).  This blog also examines a specific
class action lawsuit against NCAA, where former Texas A&M football player sued
NCAA for residual concussion affects he sustained while playing football for Texas
A&M, which potentially violated college’s duties to student-athletes, including “es-
tablishing certain medical protocols for member schools to adhere to when players
suffer certain injuries.” See id.  Plaintiff Julius Whittier argued that the NCAA
“failed to warn players of these risks,” and that he sustained severe concussion-
related injuries as a result. See id.
137. See Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 408 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (recog-
nizing that, while this case is concerned with Fair Labor Standards Act, NCAA was
not college athletes’ “employer”); see also Rhim, supra note 4, at 405 (noting “stu- R
dent athletic ‘play’ is not ‘work,’” thus removing NCAA athletes from any liability
claims under potential employer-employee relationship).
138. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 337 (addressing foreseeable risks of injury pre- R
sent in college football).
139. See id. at 341–42 (noting that this relationship is inherently “special” be-
cause heightened standard applies to duty of care between student-athletes and
colleges).
140. See id. at 342 (identifying heightened standard of care between colleges
and student-athletes, and analyzing its application in tort cases); see also Hill v.
19
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recognized duty that college athletes are afforded reasonable care,
even when those same college athletes have presumably “assumed”
the risks of playing an inherently dangerous sport.141
Knapp v. Northwestern University, decided prior to Feleccia and
further examined in the Superior Court case, is a notable case de-
ciding the “duty of care” colleges owe student athletes.142  In Knapp,
Northwestern University recruited an athlete, Nicholas Knapp, out
of high school to play college basketball.143  However, Knapp suf-
fered a cardiac arrest while playing basketball during his senior year
of high school and received a cardioverter-defibrillator to prevent
future cardiac arrests.144  Following this cardiac episode, Northwest-
ern University determined Knapp was unable to participate in col-
legiate basketball.145  Knapp filed suit against Northwestern due to
Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 676 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (reasoning that liability
may arise when defendant fails to “exercise reasonable care to perform his under-
taking,” and that “at all material times hereto, the NCAA had an irrevocable duty
to establish and enforce protocols relating to student athlete safety”).  This case
highlighted the important relationship between college athletes and the NCAA,
acknowledging that the NCAA may be liable when it fails to provide reasonable
safety measures to protect student-athletes. See id. (noting potential for liability as
result); see also Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360, 1367–68 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating Pennsylvania Supreme Court would likely recognize this “special
duty of care” to college athletes, and that “[t]here is a distinction between a stu-
dent injured while participating as an intercollegiate athlete in a sport for which
he was recruited and a student injured while pursuing his private interests”).  This
distinction is arguably inherently applicable to Pennsylvania student-athletes in-
jured while participating in collegiate athletic activities. See id. at 1368 (noting
instances where this “special duty of care” is applied to relationship between stu-
dent-athletes and colleges).
141. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 342 (discussing concept that colleges owe stu- R
dents heightened duty of care to protect student-athletes against foreseeable risks
of injury, based on both existence of “special relationship” and recognition that
collegiate sporting events are sponsored by colleges themselves and colleges profit
from student athlete involvement).
142. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 474–78 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting factual and legal background of the Knapp case including its analysis of
duty of care owed to student-athletes); see also Rhim, supra note 4, at 344–45 (dis- R
cussing legal duty of care colleges have to protect students with known medical
risks from playing collegiate sports).
143. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 345 (analyzing Northwestern’s decision to pre- R
vent Knapp from playing basketball given his condition and potential for future
cardiac arrest).  Northwestern ultimately made this decision while being mindful
of safety concerns about Knapp’s participation. See id. (examining Northwestern’s
underlying decision to prevent Knapp from playing basketball, amidst health and
safety concerns).
144. See id. at 345–46 (noting Knapp’s medical conditions prior to his involve-
ment on Northwestern University’s basketball team and analyzing Northwestern
University’s awareness of these conditions prior to Knapp’s participation in athlet-
ics at Northwestern).
145. See id. at 346 (recognizing Knapp’s medical condition and Northwest-
ern’s underlying safety concerns).
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its determination that he was ineligible to play basketball.146  Ulti-
mately, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was an
“implied duty of care” imposed on colleges on behalf of their col-
lege athletes, and thus Northwestern had a duty to Knapp to pro-
tect him from future injury, especially when Northwestern had
knowledge of his prior cardiac arrest.147  Thus, the Seventh Circuit
has already established that colleges owe student athletes a duty of
care, especially when the potential for future injury is well-
known.148
3. Public School vs. Private School Liability
Lastly, there is a difference in the required duty of care be-
tween a public school versus a private school.149  While previous
caselaw held public schools have an implied duty of care, private
school liability is more complicated.150  Debate centers over
whether private schools, specifically ones operating as “charitable
institutions,” enjoy greater immunity from tort suits as compared to
their public counterparts.151  Because private schools may operate
in both non-profit and charitable capacities, courts examine liabil-
146. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 486 (holding Northwestern University presented
enough evidence to validate its reasoning for determining Knapp was ineligible to
play basketball, including evidence Knapp was not “physically qualified” to partici-
pate, because there was significant risk of injury due to his prior cardiac arrest
while playing high school basketball).
147. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 345–46 (discussing the duty-of-care issue); see R
also Knapp, 101 F.3d at 474 (acknowledging that Seventh Circuit overturned lower
court’s decision finding Northwestern University discriminated against Knapp in
determining he was ineligible to play basketball).  The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that Northwestern University was allowed to make its own independent determina-
tions of substantial risk of injury, specifically when the school had evidence to sup-
port the possibility of future harm. See id. at 485–86 (recognizing court’s holding
for Northwestern University).
148. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 478 (discussing student athlete relationship, and
recognizing both that Northwestern owed duty to Knapp to show concern for his
safety and that Northwestern responded accordingly given Knapp’s cardiac
condition).
149. For a discussion on liability for public schools versus private schools, see
infra notes 153–157 and accompanying text. R
150. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 330–35 (noting that heightened duty of care R
exists because of need to protect students from foreseeable risks of injury, specifi-
cally when colleges have special relationship with student athletes).  For further
discussion of previous cases that have examined this duty of care, see supra notes
30–31 and accompanying text. R
151. See Allan E. Korpela, Immunity of Private Schools and Institutions of Higher
Learning from Liability in Tort, 38 A.L.R.3d 480, *2a (2019) (recognizing some juris-
dictions have assessed tort liability of private charitable schools based on whether
plaintiff was beneficiary of charity, while other courts have imposed liability on
private charitable schools for tort actions arising out of noncharitable activities).
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ity based on the school’s “profit-making facilities.”152  Furthermore,
independent businesses, owned by private schools, often are the
subject of tort lawsuits involving students.153  Therefore, courts have
analyzed whether the actions of independent businesses associated
with private schools constitute non-charitable activities, which
would allow plaintiffs to bring suit.154  The issues illustrate the diffi-
culties in assessing private school tort liability, largely due to the
differences in profit-motives for private schools.155  Lackawanna
College is a non-profit institution, so the Pennsylvania Superior
Court did not address these issues in the Feleccia decision.156  How-
ever, issues of variance in public versus private and for-profit versus
non-profit may be present in future cases assessing liability waivers
and the student athlete-college relationship.157 Therefore, it is im-
portant to recognize that while the Feleccia decision addressed one
area of liability, as future cases come to Pennsylvania courts, liability
may be examined differently depending on the institutions.158
B. Reckless Disregard is Distinguishable from Negligence
1. Minimal Standards of Care and Safety
In Feleccia, reckless disregard is distinguishable from negli-
gence when colleges have a duty to student athletes, but consciously
disregard risks involved when athletes sign liability waivers without
knowing their athletic program’s trainers are uncertified.159  The
152. See id. (analyzing cases involving private school liability, where generally
courts must first examine school’s profit-making enterprise, or whether it receives
charitable donations from outside organizations, and then must next examine re-
lationship between victim and school, before court is able to make liability
determination).
153. See id. (recognizing independent businesses operating within private
schools are often subject of tort lawsuits).
154. See id. (discussing how tort actions involving noncharitable activities are
generally not immune from suit).
155. See id. (noting challenges involved in assessing private school tort liability
compared to public schools).
156. See generally Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200, 1201 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2017) (recognizing Lackawanna College is non-profit).
157. See id. at 1201 (noting that while Lackawanna College is non-profit insti-
tution, there may be future cases where student-athletes are injured at private
institutions).
158. See generally Feleccia, 156 A.3d 1200 (recognizing potential for varied fu-
ture outcomes in Pennsylvania courts).
159. See id. at 1210–11 (reasoning “reckless disregard” requires “conscious ac-
tion or inaction” which potentially results in harmful or injurious situations, where
negligence alone suggests only “conscious inadvertence”); see also Fitsko v.
Gaughenbaugh, 69 A.2d 132, 135 (1949) (discussing “conscious inadvertence”); see
also Interassociation Consensus: Independent Medical Care for College Student-Athletes Best
Practices, NCAA SPORT SCI. INST., available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/
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NCAA Interassociation Consensus, which outlines the standards for
medical attention provided to student athletes participating in
NCAA sports, provides that “an active institution should designate a
director of medical services to oversee the institution’s athletic
health care administration and delivery.”160  The NCAA Interas-
sociation Consensus is probably applicable to Feleccia because these
standards similarly align with the types of care required by NJCAA
athletic programs.161  Lackawanna College is a member of the NJ-
CAA, which arguably has similar “minimal standards” that its mem-
ber colleges must meet.162
The Feleccia court noted the Plaintiffs “raised genuine issues of
gross negligence and recklessness” because several NCAA College
Athletic Directors opined that Lackawanna College’s conduct in
hiring Coyne and Bonisese fell below the applicable standards of
care.163  It is important to note that NJCAA’s standards were not
explicitly defined by the Feleccia court; however, the NJCAA Hand-
book and its applicable requirements for athletic training were ad-
files/2017SSI_IndependentMedicalCare_20170626.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS2J-
PYBH] (last visited Mar. 8, 2019) (discussing minimal standards of care and safety
for NCAA athletic programs).  Given similarities between the NCAA and NJCAA, it
is recognized that NCAA standards would apply to the NJCAA. See id. (recognizing
applicability of NCAA standards to Lackawanna College’s athletic program).  How-
ever, it must be noted that these standards only apply during the season, off-season
practices are excluded. See id.
160. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1217 (analyzing NCAA safety standards and appli-
cability to NJCAA).  Arguably, NCAA and NJCAA safety standards are likely very
similar. See id. (recognizing that the NJCAA has not published similar guidelines);
see also Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1211 (quoting Fitsko v. Gaughenbaugh, 363 Pa. 132
(1949) (stating that failure to take precautions against potential medical emergen-
cies may constitute reckless misconduct, as previously examined in Fitsko).
161. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1213–18 (recognizing potential applicability for
NCAA Interassociation Consensus’ written policies for ensuring adequate medical
attention for student-athletes).  The NJCAA does not have an applicable consen-
sus, but the Athletic Training Board Certification guidelines suggest that trainers
adhere to similar standards for providing medical attention. See id. (noting Supe-
rior Court’s recognition of minimum athletic training standards).
162. See id. at 1214–15 (discussing medical assistance in the context of sports,
noting that Kleinknecht has previously addressed medical care standards for stu-
dent-athletes, and NCAA similarly requires colleges to provide such medical
personnel).
163. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1213–14 (noting that Lackawanna College must
adhere to “minimal standards of care and safety” as recognized by NJCAA and
Board Certification Guidelines for collegiate athletic training).  During practice,
Coyne and Bonisese were required to adhere to the Board Certification Guidelines
for providing permissible athletic training, which were not met because both indi-
viduals were uncertified. See id. In addition, expert Richard Slocum stated that he
had “never seen the drill run as it was at Lackawanna,” and that such conduct was
definitely a “systematic oversight” by Lackawanna. See id. at 1214.
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dressed at trial.164  The NCAA Interassociation Consensus is a
recent effort by the NCAA to better determine the safety standards
for college athletic programs.165  Although the NJCAA has not es-
tablished a similar consensus, it is logical to assume the NJCAA re-
quires Junior Colleges to comply with similar standards of hiring
qualified individuals to oversee the care and training of its athletic
trainers, which would apply to Lackawanna, as a junior college in-
tercollegiate athletic program.166  This logical determination of the
NCAA’s intersection and applicability comes from an evaluation of
the NJCAA 2017-2018 Handbook, which has a “Safety” section that
outlines similar NJCAA guidelines for trainers, including that “the
NJCAA requires that a certified/licensed athletic trainer be pro-
vided at all NJCAA postseason events,” and that NJCAA “recom-
mends, at a minimum, a certified athletic trainer or EMT be
available at all regular season practices.”167  Plaintiffs’ experts M.
Scott Zema, Associate Athletic Director at Stevenson University, and
Betsey Mitchell, Director of Athletics at the California Institute of
Technology, testified that hiring uncertified athletic trainers was
not in accordance with collegiate athletic programs’ safety
guidelines.168
164. See id. at 1210–13 (recognizing that appellate court’s focus was on Ath-
letic Training Board Certification guidelines, rather than specific NJCAA rules and
regulations); see also Brief for Appellees, supra note 47, at *7–8 (addressing NJCAA R
2016–2017 Handbook and arguments made regarding Handbook’s applicability to
the 2010 football season).
165. See Interassociation Consensus: Independent Medical Care for College Student-
Athletes Best Practices, supra note 159 (explaining recent developments in NCAA R
safety guidelines).
166. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1213–14 (noting relevant safety standards, includ-
ing requirements for board certified athletic trainers).
167. See NAT’L JUNIOR COLL. ATHLETIC ASS’N 2017–2018 HANDBOOK &
CASEBOOK (2017), E.1-E.1a, available at https://d2o2figo6ddd0g.cloudfront.net/a/
1/o4bxsuaw8aflcy/2017-18_NJCAA_Handbook_Jan_4_2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BAQ3-YSMG] (examining relevant safety portions of NJCAA Handbook
and noting minimum requirements to have certified athletic trainers or EMT per-
sonnel at NJCAA practices); see also Brief for Appellees, supra note 47, at *57 not- R
ing Athletic Training Board Certification Guidelines, applicable in Feleccia case,
and connection to NCAA Interassociation Consensus, which—while not directly
applicable—highlights treatment of similar issues by collegiate athletic associa-
tions; Obtain Certification, NAT’L ATHLETIC TRAINERS ASS’N, https://www.nata.org/
about/athletic-training/obtain-certification [https://perma.cc/PE6V-XG9U] (last
visited Mar. 23, 2019) (noting athletic training guidelines for Coyne and
Bonisese’s respective employment positions at Lackawanna College).
168. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1213 (recognizing that Lackawanna’s Athletic
Trainers must adhere to Board Certification Guidelines for permissible athletic
training).
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The standards for the practice of collegiate athletic training
are well known and widely available.169  The “Board Certification
for Athletic Trainers,” which outlines all necessary steps to ob-
taining certification status for athletic trainers, provides that: to be-
come a Certified Athletic Trainer, an individual must complete an
accredited athletic education program in addition to passing a com-
prehensive national exam.170  When analyzing the safety standards
for contact football, the athletic training rules apply because the
injuries occurred during spring football practice, not during the
regular season.171  Plaintiffs’ counsel noted this distinction in the
appellate briefs and during trial, because the NJCAA by-laws recog-
nize that the same NCAA rules apply during the playing of a football
game, but not necessarily during football practices.172
2. Duty to Provide Against Foreseeable Risks of Injury
The Superior Court acknowledged liability waivers are gener-
ally considered valid if the individuals signing the documents were
169. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 47, at *57 (noting board certification R
standards for athletic training and explaining significance in relation to lack of
certification in Feleccia, as well as inherent safety risks associated with training pro-
vided by Coyne and Bonisese during contact football practice); see also Obtain Certi-
fication, NAT’L ATHLETIC TRAINERS ASS’N, supra note 167 (examining standards for
obtaining Athletic Training Certification, including working in “collaboration with
a physician and within their state practice act,” continuing education, and com-
pleting competency requirements, all which assist in ensuring athletes receive ade-
quate care during athletic events).
170. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 47, at *57–58 (recognizing resulting R
consequences of improper athletic training, and potential for injury as result of
failing to meet board certification standards); see also NAT’L JUNIOR COLL. ATHLETIC
ASS’N 2017–2018 HANDBOOK & CASEBOOK, supra note 167 at E.1- E.1a (stating that
the NJCAA requires, “at a minimum, that certified athletic trainers or EMT be
available at regular season practices”); see also Brief for Appellees, supra note 47, at R
*7–8 (acknowledging that during trial, it was contested whether current NJCAA
Handbook is applicable to 2010 football season).  Plaintiffs cited to information
requiring certified athletic trainers from 2016–2017 version of handbook, but De-
fendants’ argued those standards were inapplicable to the 2010 football season.
See id. at *8 (discussing applicability of 2010 handbook).
171. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 47, at *57 (noting arguments made R
regarding the spring 2010 football season and underlying handbook rules); see also
Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1200 (noting that Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred during spring
football practice, or “spring training,” not during regular football season, and, be-
cause of this, “Board Certification” standards would likely be more applicable,
whereas NCAA rules would apply during regular football season).
172. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 47, at *57–58 (analyzing relationship R
between NJCAA and NCAA and noting that during regular football season NCAA
rules of conduct would apply to NJCAA athletic games, while NCAA rules were not
applicable during practices).
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aware of the risks involved.173  However, the Plaintiffs in Feleccia did
not know Lackawanna College hired two uncertified athletic train-
ers.174  Additionally, colleges have a duty to provide reasonable pro-
tection against a foreseeable risk of injury.175  Such risks could arise
when the athletic trainers overseeing football practices are not qual-
ified for their respective positions.176
The Feleccia court relied on Tayar to determine that “liability
waivers are unenforceable in claims of gross negligence or reckless
conduct.”177  In Tayar, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a ski
resort’s pre-printed release did not absolve the resort of liability
when a patron was injured snow-tubing.178  The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court reviewed the liability release used by Camelback Ski
Corporation, and ultimately concluded the release failed to include
the actions of employees.179  The release notified patrons of the
“risk of collision” related to the “common receiving area” of the
resort, largely monitored by resort employees.180  However, the
court also noted that Camelback selectively avoided including its
employees in the release, and made a “deliberate decision” not to
warn the public of the dangers associated with negligent employee
monitoring of the receiving area.181  This omission illustrates types
173. See Morgan-Besecker, supra note 18 (acknowledging court’s holding in R
Feleccia, which arose out of Lackawanna College hiring uncertified athletic trainers,
and conduct of withholding that information from student athletes).
174. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1214 (noting major distinction in Feleccia, and
analyzing how both Plaintiffs lacked any knowledge that Lackawanna College’s ath-
letic trainers were uncertified, even though they knowingly signed liability waivers
releasing Lackawanna College from liability).
175. See id. at 1215 (recognizing Lackawanna’s duty of reasonable care).
176. See Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d. at 1360, 1370 (3d Cir.
1993) (discussing adequacy of college athletic program’s medical assistance and its
failure to protect student-athletes from injury).
177. See Siegel, supra note 1 (analyzing Plaintiffs’ arguments made during trial
in Feleccia and noting potential for foreseeable risks of injury due to hiring uncerti-
fied athletic trainers to oversee contact football practices, especially well-known
injurious tackle drills); see also Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47 A.3d 1190, 1196
(Pa. 2012) (holding Camelback Ski Corp. liable for making “deliberate decision”
to remove employees from protection of its liability release).
178. See Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1193 (Pa. 2012) (noting that patrons of Camelback
Ski Corp. were required to sign liability waiver before snow-tubing, which tradition-
ally would release Camelback from liability, in comparable manner to liability
waiver at issue in Feleccia).
179. See id. at 1195–96 (finding release unenforceable).
180. See id. at 1196 (discussing that Camelback’s release notified patrons of
potential risks of collision but failed to include potential negligent acts of employ-
ees who monitored receiving area).
181. See id. at 1196–97 (noting liability waiver does not release liability for
negligent acts of employees).  This is relevant to Feleccia, where Plaintiffs were una-
ware that Lackawanna College hired uncertified athletic trainers to oversee contact
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of conduct that will not absolve a defendant from liability, even
when plaintiffs have signed liability waivers.182
Similarly, Plaintiffs Resch and Feleccia knowingly signed liabil-
ity waivers regarding potential injuries sustained while playing foot-
ball.183  However, the Feleccia court, in part relying on Tayar to
determine whether liability for recklessness can be released in a
pre-injury waiver, determined Lackawanna College could be held
liable for failing to warn Plaintiffs that Coyne and Bonisese lacked
athletic training certification.184  The court relied on Tayar to de-
cide that a liability waiver could be invalidated for public policy im-
plications, specifically relating to waiving reckless conduct.185
3. Heightened Duty of Care
A “heightened duty of care” may be present when student ath-
letes may, or are likely to, incur injuries from foreseeable risks.186
As demonstrated by this Comment, courts have previously imposed
this heightened duty of care owed to students on colleges because
the risk of a foreseeable injury alone does not automatically deter-
mine liability.187  Colleges may be found liable for athletes’ injuries,
even though athletes may understand some risks associated with
football practice. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1219 (noting Plaintiffs lack of awareness
relating to Lackawanna’s uncertified trainers).
182. See Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47 A.3d 1190, 1196–97 (Pa. 2012) (rec-
ognizing Superior Court’s holding).
183. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1205 (discussing Lackawanna College’s decision
to hire uncertified athletic trainers, and examining Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge
regarding that particular issue, even when choosing to knowingly sign liability
waiver involving any injuries sustained while participating in contact football at
Lackawanna College).
184. See id. (recognizing Lackawanna College’s conduct in knowingly hiring
uncertified trainers).
185. See Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1206 (holding that deliberate omission of potential
risk associated with employee monitoring of property did not waive liability for
Camelback when the patron was injured but signed release, and similarly that
Lackawanna College’s actions of knowingly hiring uncertified trainers to oversee
contact football practices should not be released).
186. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 331–34 (noting the relationship between cer- R
tain sports activities and the heightened duty of care, and recognizing the intersec-
tion of providing different, albeit heightened, care for dangerous sports); see also
Edward Whang, Necessary Roughness: Imposing a Heightened Duty of Care on Colleges for
Injuries of Student-Athletes, 2 SPORTS L.J. 25, 44 (1995) (analyzing Kleinknecht and
determining colleges have heightened duty to provide “reasonable care” for ath-
letes’ injures that occur on college campuses and during collegiate sports
practices).
187. For a discussion on cases involving liability waivers, see supra notes 26–29 R
and accompanying text.
27
Marvin: Liability Not Waived for Lackawanna College: Athletic Programs Ma
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-2\VLS204.txt unknown Seq: 28 15-MAY-19 12:40
392 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26: p. 365
playing sports.188  Therefore, a liability waiver synthesizes both is-
sues, specifically an athlete’s acknowledgment of the risks and a col-
lege’s adherence to safety.189  First, a waiver requires athletes to
acknowledge the potential for foreseeable risks of injury.190  Sec-
ond, the waiver requires schools to adhere to the minimal safety
requirements imposed by a heightened duty of care.191
There are several ways to analyze where the standard for a
heightened duty of care arises.192  First, the heightened duty that
colleges owe to student athletes goes beyond what colleges would
ordinarily owe its non-athlete students.193  This heightened duty ex-
ists when colleges are not financially compensating athletes, and
are therefore required to go beyond the standard duties of care
owed to private students.194  Second, the relationship between col-
lege athletes and colleges themselves is considered “special.”195
While not all courts acknowledge this special relationship, in Felec-
cia, the Superior Court essentially implied this relationship exists.196
Importantly, the court reasoned that Lackawanna College may be
188. See Rhim, supra note 4, at 331–33 (discussing heightened duty of care R
requirement, and its divorce from idea that liability exists solely based on highly
foreseeable risk of injury).
189. See id. at 331 (noting how liability waiver attempts to undermine poten-
tial for future lawsuits when individuals recognize risks involved in certain
activities).
190. See id. at 335–36 (recognizing that by signing liability waiver, individuals
acknowledge risks involved in certain activities, and seemingly consent to those
risks).
191. See id. at 336–37 (acknowledging both that colleges have duty to protect
students from foreseeable risks of injury, but also that colleges are not custodians
of students—students themselves have some level of personal responsibility in en-
suring their own safety).
192. See Whang, supra note 186, at 27 (discussing several reasons why colleges
owe heightened duty of care to student-athletes, including fact that college ath-
letes provide substantial amount of both economic and noneconomic benefits to
colleges).
193. See id. (noting that special duty exists).
194. See id. at 27–28 (reasoning that duty owed to student-athletes is heighted
compared to non-athlete students, specifically because of economic and
noneconomic benefits student-athletes provide to colleges).
195. See id. at 33–34 (stating that Second Restatement of Torts examines these
special relationships under tort liability and noting that “[c]ourts are not fore-
closed from recognizing special relationships other than those specifically listed in
section 314A” of the Second Restatement of Torts, and that “if courts are willing to
recognize the student-college relationship itself as a special one, it is possible to
impose a duty of care on colleges for student injuries”).
196. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200, 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (recognizing the court’s reliance on Kleinknecht, and the Third Circuit’s pre-
diction that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find “a special relationship
existed between the [c]ollege and Drew that was sufficient to impose a duty of
reasonable care on the [c]ollege”; the Superior Court relied on this prediction in
their holding).
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liable for hiring uncertified athletic trainers and for Plaintiffs’ re-
sulting injuries, in affirming that a special relationship exists be-
tween colleges and student athletes.197  Third, a “mutual
dependence” may characterize the relationship between student
athletes and colleges.198  For example, colleges depend on student
athletes to fill stadiums and provide other economic benefits, while
student athletes depend on colleges for tuition scholarships, as well
as education.199  Lastly, the “foreseeability” of harm is greater in a
student athlete and college relationship, especially when student
athletes are engaged in dangerous sports, and therefore the duty of
care is subjected to a heightened standard.200
4. The Difference Between Reckless Misconduct and Negligence
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has previously held that
there is a distinct difference between reckless misconduct and neg-
ligence.201  In Tayar, the Court defined “recklessness” as requiring
“conscious action” thus creating a “substantial risk of harm.”202  In
contrast, “negligence” consists of “failure to take precautions” and
other actions that may lack conscious decision-making, but are still
197. See id. at 1215–16 (recognizing that while liability waiver does not waive
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, factual liability issues presented were submit-
ted to jury to determine whether Lackawanna College’s conduct constituted gross
negligence or reckless behavior).
198. See Whang, supra note 186, at 43–45 (reasoning that while courts and
NCAA have refused to acknowledge possible employer-employee relationship be-
tween colleges and student athletes, both are considered mutually dependent on
one another for certain economic reasons and thus college-student athlete rela-
tionship “is characterized by mutual dependence” and is special because colleges
must take extra steps to ensure safety of students participating in off-campus co-
curricular activities such as sports).
199. See id. at 40–41(explaining mutual dependency relationship).
200. See id. at 50 (noting that in Kleinknecht, “foreseeability was the second”
element of duty of care analysis, which is significant in analyzing its relation to
heightened standard of care).  Given that student-athletes are likely to incur fore-
seeable injuries while participating in college athletics, colleges should be sub-
jected to a heightened standard of care in order to protect student-athletes from
harm. See id. (recognizing court’s reasoning in Kleinknecht).
201. See Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47 A.3d 1190, 1200 (Pa. 2012) (“Reck-
lessness is distinguishable from negligence on the basis that recklessness requires
conscious action or inaction which creates a substantial risk of harm to others,
whereas negligence suggests unconscious inadvertence.”); see also Hinkal v. Pardoe,
133 A.3d 738, 746 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (holding that appellant’s claims were “cen-
tered on mere negligence,” not recklessness and therefore distinguishing between
both).
202. See Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1198–1200 (discussing Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s treatment of “recklessness” as distinguishable from “negligence” and rec-
ognizing that Tayar court cites to Second Restatement of Torts in analysis of distin-
guishing negligence from recklessness).
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contributory to future injuries.203  The Tayar court observed that
out of twenty-eight states that addressed the enforcement of liability
releases in cases involving reckless conduct, only two states release
reckless conduct alone.204  In contrast, a majority of states do not
release reckless conduct, even in cases involving “voluntary recrea-
tional activities.”205  Specifically, twenty-three states concluded that
releasing recklessness is against public policy.206  In addition, it can
be inferred that these same twenty-three states also invalidate re-
leases involving negligence; such are important considerations
given that Feleccia is awaiting a Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sion.207  In Pennsylvania, the Tayar court also concluded that releas-
ing recklessness would allow parties to “escape liability for
consciously” failing to protect against potential injury.208  In analyz-
ing the Tayar decision, the Feleccia court most likely correctly de-
cided not to release Lackawanna College from liability, because
hiring personnel knew Coyne and Bonisese were uncertified ath-
letic trainers, but consciously ignored the risks that lack of certifica-
tion posed to student athletes.209 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
will need to go further than the Superior Court in determining
whether Lackawanna’s conduct constituted recklessness.210
In other cases, Pennsylvania courts previously allowed plaintiffs
to recover when defendants acted with “reckless disregard” for
safety concerns.211  For example, in Wikert v. Kleppick, the plaintiff
203. See id. at 1220 (noting standard for conduct that would not release Lack-
awanna College from liability in action).
204. See id. at 1201–03 (analyzing that recklessness is not released in majority
of states that have addressed liability waiver issue, specifically in cases involving
reckless or negligent conduct).
205. See id. at 1194–98 (noting distinction between reckless and negligent
misconduct).
206. See id. at 1202–03 (examining states that have addressed this intersection
between conduct and liability waivers).
207. See id. (noting that twenty-three out of twenty-eight states have decided
against releasing both reckless and negligent care, and that federal courts applying
Pennsylvania law have not enforced releases where reckless conduct is involved).
208. See id. at 1194–98 (noting different treatment of recklessness and negli-
gent conduct among states).
209. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200, 1211–12 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (discussing decision not to release Lackawanna College from liability when
it consciously disregarded “minimal standards of care and safety” and noting that,
on appeal, Pennsylvania Supreme Court will have to analyze whether impermissi-
bly providing uncertified athletic trainers to oversee contact football constituted
gross negligence or reckless behavior); see also Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1198–99 (discuss-
ing “minimal standards of care and safety” which were also addressed in Feleccia).
210. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1216 (recognizing limitations in lower court’s
holding in submitting the liability waiver issue to jury).
211. See Wikert v. Kleppick, 8 Pa. D. & C.4th 193, *10–11 (C.P. Allegheny
1990) (noting problematic approach to relying on “assumption of risk” doctrine
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was participating in a hockey game when he collided with the de-
fendant and was struck in the face with a hockey stick.212  The plain-
tiff suffered injuries as a result and filed suit against the defendant
for negligent conduct.213  The plaintiff based his negligence claim
on the theory that the defendant failed to “exercise reasonable care
and control over the existing circumstances.”214  The Court of Com-
mon Pleas determined that reckless conduct is different from negli-
gence in that the degree of risk is substantially different.215 Given
Lackawanna College’s active role in hiring uncertified athletic
trainers to oversee potentially dangerous tackle drills, Lackawanna
College should be found grossly negligent, or even reckless, in im-
permissibly allowing those uncertified trainers to provide athletic
training services to student athletes.216  Similarly, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court should consider the factors present in Kleinknecht
and Tayar when making its final liability determination.217
D. Future Cases: Liability Waivers Are Not the Ultimate
Protection
1. Impact on Pennsylvania Cases Following Feleccia v. Lackawanna
College
In future Pennsylvania cases, a liability waiver may not automat-
ically waive liability for colleges that consciously disregard minimal
standards of care and safety when those colleges have a duty to pro-
vide a safe playing environment for students.218  However, the “min-
imal standards of care and safety” should be better defined so
colleges have notice of the required safety standards, and a judge is
when evaluating plaintiffs’ liability claims, specifically in event of inherently dan-
gerous activities, because in those instances courts will simply presume plaintiff has
assumed all risks of that particular activity).
212. See id. at *1–2 (recognizing when assumption of risk doctrine applies and
examining its treatment by courts when defendants’ conduct constitutes gross neg-
ligence or reckless behavior).
213. See id. at *2 (explaining that plaintiff’s suit contained two counts, one for
assault and battery—claiming that Defendant intentionally struck Plaintiff with
hockey stick—and another for negligence).
214. See id. at *1 (reasoning that Defendant acted with “reckless disregard for
Plaintiff’s safety,” creating likelihood that Plaintiff could sustain injuries as result).
215. See id. at *6–7 (analyzing degrees of risk between negligence and reckless
misconduct).
216. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200, 1217–20 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (providing Superior Court’s reasoning).
217. See id. at 1214–15 (noting Superior Court’s focus on Tayar and
Kleinknecht, which were persuasive for Superior Court’s reasoning and liability
analysis).
218. See id. at 1200–05 (discussing Lackawanna College’s reckless disregard
for Feleccia and Resch’s safety during football practices).
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better able to determine such required minimal safety standards.219
The Feleccia court largely relied on Tayar to determine that a valid
liability waiver will not prevent an individual from bringing suit
against a college when that college’s conduct constituted gross neg-
ligence or recklessness.220  Future Pennsylvania cases involving fact
patterns similar to Feleccia and Tayar will likely make similar
determinations.221
Daniel J. Siegel, Esq. represented the Plaintiffs in Feleccia.222  In
his online publication, Siegel argued that “enforcing a release and
granting summary judgment in a situation where the availability of
qualified medical personnel is called into question would jeopard-
ize the health and safety of such student athletes.”223  Specifically,
he advocates that allowing a liability waiver to release a college from
such egregious conduct “removes at least one incentive for colleges
to adhere to minimal standards of care and safety.”224  Therefore,
Siegel supports the Feleccia court’s holding that a college may be
liable for certain reckless actions when it knowingly hires uncerti-
fied athletic trainers to oversee an inherently dangerous sport.225
2. A Win for Plaintiffs in Cases Involving a Special Duty of Care
Feleccia is the first Pennsylvania case to specifically address the
issue of the relationship between student athletes and colleges, and
219. See id. at 1220 (noting that in Feleccia, court submitted issues of liability
waiver, and Lackawanna College’s conduct in hiring two, uncertified athletic train-
ers to oversee contact football practices to jury as opposed to judge making final
liability determination).
220. See Siegel, supra note 1 (recognizing duty owed to college athletes, and R
importance of adhering to minimal safety standards); see also Tayar v. Camelback Ski
Corp., 47 A.3d 1190, 1202–03 (Pa. 2012) (noting Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
decision to hold individuals liable for grossly negligent or reckless behavior).
221. For further discussion of the holding of Feleccia based on an analysis of
previous caselaw, see infra note 249 and accompanying text.  For further discussion R
of how a California Superior Court has addressed similar liability issues and deter-
mined that a specific duty of care exists between colleges and student-athletes,
while also noting that other states may move in a similar direction, see infra note
228 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of how Tayar predicted the R
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would acknowledge a similar duty of care, see supra
note 30 and accompanying text. R
222. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1200–01 (recognizing attorneys on record).
223. See Siegel, supra note 1 (noting reasons why colleges should be held lia- R
ble for failing to meet minimal safety standards, even when student-athletes sign
liability waivers releasing colleges from personal injury lawsuits).
224. See id. (recognizing importance of upholding minimal standards of care
and safety, especially in case of student-athletes); see also Feleccia, 156 A.3d at
1208–09 (addressing minimal standards of care and safety arguments).
225. See generally Feleccia, 156 A.3d 1200 (analyzing reckless actions Lack-
awanna College knowingly took when hiring uncertified athletic trainers).
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whether a liability waiver releases colleges from negligent or reck-
less conduct; however, other Pennsylvania cases have addressed sim-
ilar duty of care issues.226  While this case is pending Pennsylvania
Supreme Court review, student athletes in Pennsylvania have an im-
proved chance of prevailing in personal injury suits, even in the
event of signing a liability waiver, where colleges blatantly disre-
garded minimal standards of care and safety.227  Pennsylvania, fol-
lowing the Superior Court’s decision in Feleccia, is moving towards
recognizing this duty of care; California, as a point of comparison,
already expressly recognizes that college students are entitled to a
special duty of care.228  In UCLA v. Rosen, a female student was
badly injured during a school chemistry course when a classmate
attacked her with a knife.229  In this case, while the attacker had not
previously exhibited signs of aggression and violent tendencies, the
court found UCLA failed to take action to protect its students when
it had knowledge of the individual’s schizophrenic issues and
targeting of a particular student at UCLA.230  The Superior Court
of Los Angeles explicitly defined the duty owed to students, reason-
226. See id. at 1206–09 (examining liability waiver issue under analysis of stu-
dent athlete-college relationship and recognizing that liability waiver cannot waive
reckless conduct by colleges, which inadvertently places student-athletes at greater
risk of harm).  For further discussion of previous cases which have assessed a simi-
lar duty of care and liability analysis, including Tayar, which is a Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court case that examines the liability waiver issue, although the case does
not present issues involving college athletes, see supra notes 27–31 and accompany- R
ing text.
227. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1200–05 (analyzing that future plaintiffs will have
to show colleges acted recklessly or with gross negligence, and that such conduct
was not assumed by plaintiffs who knowingly consented to inherent risks of partici-
pating in collegiate athletics).
228. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court of L.A., 240 Cal. Rptr. 3d,
675, 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) [hereinafter UCLA v. Rosen] (noting Appellate
Court’s holding, emphasizing “we simply hold that they have a duty to act with
reasonable care when aware of a foreseeable threat” to students’ safety); see also
Marilyn Z. Kutler and Karen Baillie, United States: California Creates Special Duty for
Colleges to Protect Students, MONDAQ (Apr. 3, 2018), http://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/x/687624/Education/California+Court+Creates+Special+Duty+for+
Colleges+to+Protect+Students [https://perma.cc/P66E-FRGH] (recognizing es-
tablishment of new duty-of-care that California colleges owe students).
229. See id. at 683 (recognizing how California has become one of first states
to explicitly recognize special relationship between colleges and students, placing
duty on schools to “take reasonable steps to protect students when [the school] be-
comes aware of foreseeable threat to their safety”) (emphasis in original).
230. See id. (establishing that UCLA was aware of attacker’s schizophrenia and
had knowledge that this individual was targeting Plaintiff during school).  The fac-
tual background of UCLA v. Rosen led the court to establish a recognizable duty of
care that colleges owe students. See id.
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ing that colleges must take “reasonable steps” to ensure students’
safety, specifically in the event of foreseeable injury.231
Similarly, the Feleccia case followed the California Superior
Court’s recognition of the special duty of care owed to students.232
However, the California Superior Court has better defined that
duty of care, specifically concluding UCLA acted unreasonably
when it ignored a student’s violent behavior, subsequently putting
other UCLA students at risk.233  Thus, in future tort cases, state
courts may find colleges liable for conduct that falls outside of this
“reasonableness” standard, or similarly constitutes reckless or
grossly negligent conduct that is not waiveable by an exculpatory
clause.234  While “reasonable conduct” is a California standard, col-
lege athletes in Pennsylvania and across the United States may simi-
larly argue that a college’s conduct falls outside the assumption of
risk doctrine, and thus is amenable to suit.235  The cases examined
in this Comment, including Tayar, Sa v. Red Frog Events LLC, and
Knapp illustrate that United States courts are already moving in this
direction.236
In Feleccia, the Supreme Court will decide whether Lack-
awanna’s conduct of hiring two uncertified athletic trainers was
negligent, and whether such negligence was waived when Plaintiffs
knowingly signed a liability waiver.237  Ultimately, Lackawanna Col-
lege’s conduct should not be waiveable; hiring uncertified athletic
trainers to oversee contact football and allowing them to instruct
231. See id. (noting California Court of Appeal for the Second District’s deter-
mination that colleges must take reasonable steps to ensure students’ safety).
232. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1217–20 (noting that Superior Court invalidated
the liability waiver, but submitted the issue of negligence to a jury, in contrast to
UCLA v. Rosen case discussed above).
233. See UCLA v. Rosen, 240 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 687–89 (defining reasonableness
standard for special duty of care cases involving California universities).
234. See Kutler and Baillie, supra note 228 (recognizing future impact of Cali- R
fornia’s reasonableness approach to liability, and Pennsylvania Superior Court’s
similar analysis regarding Lackawanna College’s conduct and Plaintiffs’ abilities to
bring suit).
235. See id. (recognizing applicability of Feleccia and Rosen cases to future
plaintiffs in factually similar circumstances who may be able to sue colleges whose
conduct falls outside assumption of risk doctrine).
236. For further discussion of these cases, which held in favor of plaintiffs
whose conduct arguably fell under the assumption-of-risk doctrine because of the
egregious and reckless nature of the defendants’ conduct, see supra notes 29, 63, R
and 146 and accompanying text, respectively. R
237. See generally Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (recognizing “knowing” conduct by Plaintiffs within negligence action).  For
further discussion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s holding and determina-
tion that a liability waiver does not automatically waive liability, see supra note 110 R
and accompanying text.
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college athletes on a notoriously dangerous tackle drill puts stu-
dents directly at risk of harm in an already inherently dangerous
sport.238  While students consent to known risks of playing football
under the assumption of risk doctrine, colleges must adhere to
minimal safety standards because students rely on those standards
to protect them in an injury-prone environment.239
In total, Feleccia reminds colleges of their legal obligation to
students to provide the minimal standard of care.240  While the
Feleccia ruling does not change the assumption of risk doctrine, fu-
ture college athletes injured while participating in college athletic
programs as a result of a college’s negligent or reckless conduct
now have a better opportunity to sue, even when they knowingly
signed a liability waiver.241  A liability waiver may no longer auto-
matically shield colleges from all personal injury liability.242  Given
that the Board of Athletic Training has specific guidelines in place
to protect students, and Lackawanna College knew its athletic train-
ers were impermissibly providing athletic safety services, the Feleccia
Superior Court decision evens the playing field for students’ right-
ful legal interests in bringing suit.243
V. CONCLUSION: WHY SAFETY SHOULD NOT BE WAIVABLE
Feleccia was correctly decided on the basis of a liability waiver
not waiving the college’s reckless disregard for its student athletes’
safety.244  Ultimately, the Superior Court determined that Plaintiffs
238. See id. at 1205–07 (analyzing how Lackawanna’s uncertified athletic train-
ers, Coyne and Bonisese, recklessly provided tackling instruction during
Oklahoma Drill and also instructed Resch to continue participating immediately
following his injuries, which ultimately resulted in Resch sustaining additional seri-
ous cervical and lumbar injuries).
239. See id. (recognizing potential for injury when participating in high risk
activities, as well as nexus between defendants’ reckless conduct and plaintiffs’
injury).
240. See id. at 1208–09 (noting that while jury in Feleccia determined liability,
Superior Court still recognized that Lackawanna College had duty to provide mini-
mal standards of care and safety to its students participating in athletic programs).
241. See id. at 1209 (recognizing court’s holding and its potential effects on
future Pennsylvania personal injury cases involving grossly negligent or reckless
conduct by college athletic programs).
242. See id. (noting court’s reasoning).  For further discussion of the impact
of Feleccia on future athletes, see supra note 18 and accompanying text. R
243. For further discussion of Lackawanna College’s conduct, how Defend-
ants argued to have this conduct waived under the assumption of risk doctrine,
and the fact that Plaintiffs knowingly signed a liability waiver, see supra note 217 R
and accompanying text.
244. For further discussion of the court’s reasoning for determining why
Lackawanna College may be liable for reckless disregard for the minimal standards
of care and safety owed to college athletes, see supra notes 216–219 and accompa- R
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could sue Lackawanna College, despite the presence of a liability
waiver, and concluded that Lackawanna College may not disregard
minimal standards of care and safety when providing athletic train-
ing.245  In his online legal publication, Siegel reasoned that because
many schools benefit from student athletes, enforcing a release that
risks their health and safety is troublesome.246  Therefore, following
the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in Feleccia, athletic insti-
tutions should be incentivized to specifically adhere to athletic
training certification guidelines.247  Colleges must continue to fol-
low athletic training guidelines because athletic programs must pro-
vide qualified medical personnel under the minimal standards for
care and safety.248  In reviewing the factual circumstances in Feleccia,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should be persuaded by Plaintiffs’
expert’s testimony during trial, offering evidence that providing
qualified medical personnel is a duty of care requirement.249
Pennsylvania colleges may find themselves liable for student
athletes’ injuries, even when those athletes sign liability waivers.250
Under Feleccia, most recently, liability is not waived when colleges
have disregarded the minimal standards of care and safety, and also
did not take necessary action to prevent foreseeable risks of injury
nying text; see also Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360, 1363 (3d Cir.
1993) (analyzing special duty of care standards, and reasoning that because stu-
dent-athletes are participating in school sponsored athletic programs, colleges
have special relationship with student-athletes).
245. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1204, 1210–11 (noting Lackawanna College had
knowledge Coyne and Bonisese were “impermissibly providing athletic services”
and determination that liability waivers cannot release such conduct); see also Brief
for Appellees, supra note 47, at *57–58 (analyzing Board of Athletic Training Certi- R
fication, and recognizing that by failing to hire athletic trainers with board certifi-
cation status, Lackawanna put its students at risk of inadequate athletic training
services, increasing their chances for injury).
246. See Siegel, supra note 1 (“Enforcing a release and granting summary R
judgment in a situation where the availability of qualified medical personnel is
called into question would jeopardize the health and safety of such student-ath-
letes by removing at least one incentive for colleges to ‘adhere to minimal stan-
dards of care and safety.’”).
247. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1205–06 (noting that even though impact of
Bonisese and Coyne’s conduct on Feleccia and Resch’s injuries was ultimately sub-
mitted to jury, Pennsylvania Superior Court did not automatically excuse Lack-
awanna College’s conduct in hiring uncertified athletic trainers).
248. See Siegel, supra note 1 (explaining relationship between providing quali- R
fied medical personnel and minimal standards of care and safety, which colleges
must be required to adhere to in order to preserve their student athletes’ safety).
249. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d 1213–14 (recognizing that expert testimony during
trial provided specific evidence that Lackawanna College breached its duty of care
by impermissibly providing substandard medical care).
250. See generally id. (holding that colleges may be liable to student-athletes
when those colleges are reckless in failing to meet minimal safety standards).
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to student athletes.251  While football is an inherently dangerous
sport, the assumption of risk doctrine should not be applicable in
cases involving gross negligence or reckless disregard for safety pro-
cedures.252  In examining the facts of the Feleccia case and the subse-
quent Superior Court decision, the conduct by Lackawanna College
should not be excused.253  Plaintiffs Feleccia and Resch did not as-
sume the risk of being supervised by uncertified trainers, who were
supervising football players without the certification required to do
so.254
Knowingly permitting uncertified athletic trainers to oversee
contact football practices, in addition to providing instruction on a
well-known, dangerous tackle drill, should not be covered under a
college’s liability waiver.255  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
should hold accordingly upon review of the Superior Court’s deci-
sion in Feleccia.256  Lastly, the Supreme Court should go further
than the Superior Court and hold that impermissibly providing un-
certified athletic trainers to oversee inherently dangerous activities
constitutes gross negligence or reckless conduct.257
Rachael Marvin*
251. See id. (noting Superior Court’s holding and most recent decision, but
recognizing this case is currently awaiting Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision).
252. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 47, at *54–55 (discussing assumption R
of risk doctrine and its applicability in various tort cases).
253. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1204–05 (recognizing that Lackawanna College
was notified that Coyne and Bonisese were “impermissibly providing athletic ser-
vices” during spring contact football practice, as brought to Lackawanna College’s
attention prior to Feleccia and Resch’s injuries).
254. See id. at 1204 (providing Superior Court’s reasoning).
255. See id. (recognizing significance of finding Lackawanna College liable if
its decision to hire uncertified athletic trainers was grossly negligent or reckless
conduct, which would satisfy liability threshold even when Plaintiffs knowingly
signed liability waivers).
256. See id. at 1200–04 (analyzing court’s holding and recognizing that Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court should affirm Superior Court’s decision in Feleccia
accordingly).
257. For further discussion of the Superior Court’s decision, its analysis of the
appropriate standard of care for Lackawanna College, and how the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court should hold in examining the Tayar decision, see supra notes
29–50 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; James Madison College - Michigan State University, 2017.  I would like to
thank my parents, boyfriend, and friends who supported me throughout the writ-
ing process.  I would especially like to thank my Journal editors, Matthew
McElvenny and Isabel Naveira, and the rest of the Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Jour-
nal staff for their hard work and assistance in editing this Comment.
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